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Introduction

The states ofEurope and the European Union are facing one ofthe greatest challenges since the founding
of the European Community in the 1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War have served

to strengthen the position of the European Union as a guarantor of democracy, peace, and fundamental human

rights in Europe. However, crises such as the Balkan conflicts of recent years have also exposed inherent

weaknesses inthe Union's ability to respond to the changing international environment. As the Amsterdam Treaty
entered into effect on 1 May 1999, the EU marked a significant first step towards remedying its historical
shortcomings and institutional weaknesses. Yet the Union's failure to respond to its most recent international

challenge, the crisis in Kosovo, revealed the fact that much work remains to be done. The challenges facing the
EU are numerous, and more momentous than any in the past. With virtually every state onthe continent ofEurope

seeking tobecome a member ofthe EU, membership is widely viewed throughout Central and Eastern Europe asa
panacea to the transitional problems confronting the post-Communist states. Events on the European continent,
proceeding at an astonishing rate, threaten toovertake the arduous pace ofreform in the European Union.
Similarly, the Union is facing challenges from within, as issues of citizen participation, democratic

accountability and transparency have come to dominate recent discussion on the institutional structure of Europe.

Inorder to legitimize the process ofEuropean integration, economic integration must be complemented by political
and cultural dimensions which reflect an awareness ofthe values and norms that unite European society. The idea

ofa European identity may bring about short-term difficulties in the reform and expansion ofthe European Union,

but will serve to solidify the Union in the long run and anchor the states of Central and Eastern Europe in a

framework ofnorms and values extending beyond economic integration. In the context ofthis paper, examining
the European identity also involves looking at how this identity impacts on the nation-state ideal and the national

identities which have characterized European politics since the mid 17th century. Furthermore, it is necessary to
investigate how the shared norms and values ofthe integration process play out in the ongoing institutional reform
of the EU. This paper argues that a collective identity built upon shared norms and values is central to the

transition of the European Union to a more comprehensive system of governance in Europe. At the same time, a
common normative framework forms an essential element to the pendingeastward expansion of the Union.

In coming to terms with the numerous challenges facing the European Union, a series of conferences and

documents can be identified as central to development of the Union. Although the 1991 Treaty of European Union

(theMaastricht Treaty) was the first thorough institutional reform the European Union had seen since the Treaty of
Rome, the continual process of European integration confirms that subsequent advances are equally important, and

likely to playa more central role in the future of the Union. The rapid movement towards economic and political
union through institutional development without an accompanying process of public consultation and input has
resulted in a strong popular backlash to the integration process, as demonstrated by the Danish rejection of the

Maastricht Treaty and the very narrow passage of the Treaty in France. Despite the very real, necessary
institutional reformsof the Maastricht Treaty, the associatednegative experience of the negotiation and ratification
process have led many to view the ensuing Amsterdam Treaty as a non-contentious settlement, palatable to all EU
memberstates yet lacking in substance. Nevertheless, the lessons from the Maastricht Treaty were taken to heart:
the institutional restructuring in the Amsterdam Treaty may not be as sweeping as Maastricht, but the Amsterdam
Treaty reflects to a much greater degree the concerns and issues facing the citizens of the European Union.

After Maastricht, the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference in Turin, Italy, paved the way for both the
Amsterdam Treaty and for the Agenda 2000 report prepared by the European Commission.

Together, the

Amsterdam Treaty and the Agenda 2000 constitute the framework for both the expansion of the Union and for

future institutional reforms. An EU publication entitled The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide notes that

"The Intergovernmental Conference which drew up the Treaty of Amsterdam was endeavouring both to confer
greater democratic legitimacy on the European institutions and to improve the efficiency of the institutional

framework in anticipation of enlargement" (European Commission, The Amsterdam Treaty). Most notably, the
Treaty of Amsterdam institutionalizes several areas of cooperation which were previously intergovernmental in
nature. The treaty seeks to capture, through institutionalization, a slowly growing "comfort zone" among citizens
and elites for Union competencies and policy responsibilities, and also sets the stage for a the expansion of Union
membership and competencies.

Subsequently, the Agenda 2000 addressed issues central to the accession

negotiations and future expansion of the Union. In this manner, the expansion process is forcing the Union to
define itself in both institutional and normative terms. Central to both documents is the very definition of what
constitutes "Europe" and the "European Union", and what the European Union of the future will look like.

For the Union, the basic question remains the age-old dilemma ofwidening versus deepening. Proponents
ofwidening favor an expansion ofthe Union into the Central and East European states without the addition ofnew

policy areas or institutional "tightening" to the Union structure. In general, a widening of the Union denotes an

expansion ofUnion membership through loose intergovernmental arrangement between states, with plenty ofroom
for national policy and decision making. On the other hand, the deepening of the Union refers to institutional
reforms and an expansion of the Union's competencies which would create an EU that would be more federalist in

nature: the Union would have precedence over national governments in many more policy areas and the adherence
to Union directives and regulations among member states would be tightly regulated. In fact the Union is faced

with the daunting task ofwidening and deepening at the same time. The present institutional structure is woefully
inadequate for a union of twenty or more members, and yet pressure from (and for) the applicant nations is so
strong that it is unlikely the Union will be able to conclude another series of reforms on the scale of Amsterdam

and Maastricht before admitting new members. Recent developments in the Balkan region, however, have

impressed upon European leaders the urgency of the international situation, and have generated considerable
discussion on the matter.

While the Union's commitment to expansion to the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) was

reaffirmed in the Amsterdam Treaty, and more recently in the Commission's Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and
Wider Union, the challenge presented in the expansion is significant on three accounts. First, the new members

are less qualified than past applicants: They are only fledgling democracies with underdeveloped market
economies, most of which are still in the transition from the state-run systems of the Soviet era; a significant
amount ofinstitutional and normative reform are necessary to bring the CEECs up to speed. Secondly, the CEECs
are entering a tighter, stricter, deeper Union than previous accession candidates, a factor which compounds their
relative underdevelopment. Lastly, the CEECs will be the first group of nations from outside the "Western

European Tradition" in which all other members have existed and operated for the past fifty years. Thus the
eastward expansion will place new demands not only on the institutional structure of the Union, but also on its

philosophical underpinnings. The CEECs have a very different perspective and radically different historical
experiences than the EU 15. Though this does not preclude their membership, or diminish their chances in the
long term, it does impact substantially on present perceptions, expectations and motivations for both the CEECs

and the EU 15. Both sides possess different conceptions of "Europe" and the "European Identity", and while the
primary motivation for the CEECs is economic, the Union is concerned that advances in democracy, fundamental
rights and market reforms would collapse into a nationalist resurgence if these states are not tied to the West
through the institutions and norms of the EU.

While maintaining that all applicants must conform to the EU principles of democracy- and human rights,
meet certain economic criteria, and accept the body of EU laws and norms (the acquis communautaire) before

being admitted, the EU has begun to demonstrate both flexibility and innovation in preparing for the expansion of
the Union. The Accession Partnership and various financial assistance programs concluded with each accession
applicant represent significant efforts to ensure not only a smooth transition to full membership, but also to ensure

that the EU 15 are adequately prepared for the expansion. The EU is faced with a delicate balancing act as related
to the question of deepening versus widening: how long can the EU tool with structural and institutional reform

before another Kosovo erupts? And to what extent is institutional deepening required, in the form of further

integration within the EU and preparation for the accession candidates, to pave the way for the expanded
membership? While there have been plenty of pronouncements, goals and objectives formulated by the EU 15,
there is a lack of practical solutions to the issues of enlargement and institutional reform. The Union is divided

over precisely this issue, with the traditional arguments between a federalist and an intergovernmental vision of
European integration being grafted onto the debate between deepening and widening. The Treaty of Amsterdam
and the Agenda 2000 address precisely these issues and divisions in the European Union, and for this reason, an

in-depth examination of these most recent reforms and positions of the European Union reveals much about the
future of the Union, its institutions, membership, and focus.
At the same time that the EU faces expansion and institutional reform, the concerns of citizens in the
current member states are influencing the nature and direction of EU reform. On this account, one of the chief

objectives of the Amsterdam Treaty process was to bring the Union closer to the citizen. The widely perceived
"democracy deficit" in the Union has become an overriding concern for Brussels, and it became clear the concerns

and alienation of the EU citizens needed to be addressed. The reforms contained in the Amsterdam Treatyrepresent the beginnings of a much more democratic, participatory European political system.

The

institutionalization of several new areas of cooperation are all aimed at bringing the Union closer to its citizens:

making the EU more accessible, more democratic, and more legitimate in the eyes of the people. It is precisely for
this reason that the Amsterdam Treaty is so momentous—up until this point, institutional change had been a
process which was essentially engineered by bureaucrats and technocrats in Brussels. Now. however, the EU is

beginning the transition into a complete system of governance, and is consequently facing demands for citizen

participation and democratic legitimization of EU policies. The EU has advanced beyond the stage of an

international organization defined solely by inter-state agreements and treaties; the direct impact on European
citizens by the EU has resulted in calls for democratic legitimacy and citizen input at the European level. The
traditional method of"making Europe", whereby "the elites negotiate for the people and ask them only afterward if at all - whether they agree" (Garton Ash 1997, 122) is slowly being superseded by a more citizen-minded

integration process. In this respect, the Amsterdam Treaty is far more citizen-oriented that any ofthe previous
documents and treaties on European integration. The reforms of the Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties are

different in scope and purpose, but equally vital to the process ofoverall development and integration in Europe.
Though the Amsterdam Treaty was a large step towards redressing the historical shortcomings of the
Union, there still remains a significant gap between the bureaucratic institutions in Brussels and the lives of

European citizens. The issues of democratic accountability, institutional reform and expansion of the Union arc
closely interrelated - without addressing the needs and concerns ofitspresent population, there is little chance that

the EU will receive public support for expansion (and additional expenditure) in Eastern Europe. In sum. the
Amsterdam Treaty and the Agenda 2000 set the tone for the future of European integration in all of these issue

areas. In order to understand the challenges facing the Union, we must first examine the idea of Europe - the

European identity that stands at the center ofthe debate surrounding the institutional reform and expansion ofthe
European Union.

European Identity

Nearly fifty years of European cooperation and integration have shaped events throughout the European
continent, and few movements have had such a systematic, pervasive influence on the history and lives of so many

people. Though the European integration process has been primarily focused on economic integration, only
recently touching on political, social and internal affairs, the side-effects of the drive toward the Common Market

and the Euro have spread throughout European society, influencing all levels and all spheres of activity. Upon
initial examination, the history- and process of European integration often appears strictly institutional, driven by a

mixture of national interest and bureaucratic process. Yet a closer examination reveals that the integration process
has had a profound impact on the lives of people within the European Union. Beyond laws and regulations, the
process of European integration has worked to mold and alter the perceptions of the European people.
The post-WWII state of affairs in Europe, dominated by the Cold War division between East and West,

made it much easier for Western Europe to define itself as an entity in opposition to the Soviet Union and its
satellite states. Since the end of the Cold War. the issue of European identity—and specifically the norms and

values at the foundation of the integration process—have become the subject of much attention. In this respect, it
is only recently that investigations into the "European Identity" or European (self-)consciousness have been

undertaken with much seriousness. No doubt, this is due in part to the immanent expansion of the EU into Central
and Eastern Europe. Over the past half-century the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) have not

shared in the same normative and cultural history—a factor which has been of tremendous importance throughout
the growth of the EU in West Europe. The extensive, arduous process of preparing the CEECs for accession to the
EU points to the vast amount of work necessary to ensure compatibility with the institutions and normative
structure of the EU.

The accession partnerships and other instruments designed to prepare the CEECs for

accession requirements in the fields of democracy, fundamental rights, market reforms, and community law (the
acquis) center on familiarization and internalization of these norms, with the hope that the mechanics and politics

of the integration process become "second nature" because they are built on a common normative perspective.
Now. at this juncture of expansion, Europe faces the challenge of defining itself and elucidating the values and
norms which will constitute the essence of the integration and expansion process.

Europe and National Identity

Though the integration process has centered on the economic and, to a certain degree, the political
sectors, the idea and influence of the European Union extends beyond the realm of the current political and
economic integration, informing social and cultural norms as well.

Recent research from Kaelble, Smith and

others point towards the gradual formation of a European component to identity throughout the area of the EU. As

the integration process continues, additional change in the identity and normative framework of all Europeans is
certain to transpire. In some cases, such normative transformation may result from the integration process; in
other cases, it may actually drive the integration process forward by influencing or determining the course of action
for European actors. At any rate, the normative aspect of the integration process is closely interrelated to the
institutional structure of the European Union, such that both are essential to the overall development of the Union.
With regard to identity in Europe. Smith notes that the numerous, exhaustive studies of the political and

economic elements of integration have resulted in the neglect of other, equally vital aspects to the integration
process, as "...relatively little attention has been devoted to the cultural and psychological issues associated with
European identification—to questions of meaning, value and symbolism" (Smith 1997. 320). The fact remains
that, despite the advances in the integration process in all areas, national identification still remains the norm for

the citizens of Europe. Policyareas which impact directly on the citizen, such as education, social benefits, and, to
a large extent, employment, remain under the purview of national governments. The will of the citizen is still

expressed to national governments in the majority of cases, rather than being directed to the institutions in
Brussels. The resulting incongruency between political trends at the EU level and values and norms defined at the

national level have resulted in societal tensions which are manifested in the frustration and disapproval of Union
policies and through the complaints of a "democracy deficit" in Europe.

To be certain, national identity, historically a powerful and predominant norm in Europe, is being
challenged and transformed through the integration process.

In contrast to the European norm of national

identification, which has prevailed overthe last 150 years, modernity has been characterized by "...an accelerating
process of globalization: of trends and processes that transcend the boundaries of national states and ethnic

communities, and that serve to bind together into common economic, political and cultural patterns the various
populations..." (Smith 1997, 328). As both Smith and Kaelble observe, the increase in activities which transcend

national boundaries is readily observable, particularly in Europe; therefore the real question is just how such

activity influences identity, and whether it serves to unite (or divide) populations in any meaningful way (Smith
1997, 328; Kaelble 1995, 14).

The existence ofnational boundaries, divided populations and specifically defined communities (ethnic,
religious, linguistic, etc.) are largely a result of the nationalist ideologies which, over the course of time, have
defined the nation-state ideal in Europe and aided rulers in uniting populations within territorial states. The
powerful forces of nationalist ideology rest on three basic tenants, an understanding of which is central to the
greater question of identity in modern Europe: a common past, a shared present, and a collective vision of the

common future. Inconjunction, these three elements foster a sense ofbelonging together, which became the norm

of national identity in Europe. Whether real or perceived invented or imposed, the strength of a nationalist

ideology rests with the belief among a given population that these three factors are indeed the real, naturally
destined past, present and future for the community in question. Thus a common identity is largely subjective in
nature: certain elements of the past are emphasized and others are suppressed (be it by collective will or by elite
groups), such that a common narrative legitimates the existence and action ofthe national group. As a result, the
nation is simultaneously extant in the past, present and future:

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this
soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in
common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live
together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that once has received in an undivided

form. [...] To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to
have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more—these are the essential
conditions for being a people (Renan 1996, 52).

The challenge which national identity poses to the process of European identification is significant, and in this
regard the cultural and social implications ofintegration take on increased meaning. As Smith notes. "At issue

has been the possibility and the legitimacy of a 'European identity', as opposed to the existing national identities"
(Smith 1996, 319). The question is whether a legitimate European identity can complement or coexist with the

predominant national identities of Europe. The issue is necessary to examine simply because, at present, it is
national identity which legitimates the power and policy of the individual member states in Europe, and the
citizens ofEurope are often left with recourse only to the national level (not the European level): onlv 56% of

European citizens identify with Europe, compared with 89% who identify with their country (Eurobarometer No.

51. 8). It is necessary to forge a link between the cultural and social values of Europe and the politics ofthe
European Union in order to legitimate the system such that the normative and institutional frameworks are

mutually reinforcing, the politics of Europe must give expression to the values and norms of the citizens of Europe,

and not simply reflect the technocratic policies of Brussels bureaucrats. However, in this very form of identity.
Smith notes that "...'Europe' is deficient both as idea and as process. Above all it lacks a pre-modern past - a
'prehistory' which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth" (Smith 1997, 325). The legends
ofthe founders of the European Community (Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Jean Monnet. etc.) have not

been sufficiently aggrandized to serve this purpose, and the dry. technocratic nature of integration up to the present
reminds us only of the relatively powerless, "...fundamentally memoryless nature of any cosmopolitan culture

created today. Such a culture must be consciously, even artificially constructed out of the existing national
cultures..." (Smith 1996, 330). While the strength ofnational identities lies the in shared past, present and future,

one senses that Europe lacks the crucial element of a common (indeed mythical) past upon which a meaningful
identity can be built.

AEuropean identity must somehow enhance the national identity without replacing or suppressing the

valid national identification. The fact of the matter is that such identification cannot be imposed from the top
down through politico-economic integration and elite decision-making processes. In order to be authentic, to

actually link politics to culture and values at the European level and thereby legitimate the notion of European
integration, the European identity must be one which subsists among the citizens of Europe. Apotential resolution

to this dilemma is to be found in the recognition that the European identity exists alongside the national identity.
It is important to note that an increasing awareness of the European identity does not mean that national, regional
or local identities are being erased or superseded—though this is often the common perception. Identity is neither

homogeneous among a given population, nor is it a zero-sum game. Identity is a dynamic, evolving conception,
which is both individual and multi-faceted. Prasenjit Duara writes that

While the modern nation-state system clearly influences national identity—especially its efforts
to confine loyalty to a territory—the latter is by no means determined by the former. In order to
understand national identity more fully, it needs to be studied in relation to other identities, as
part of the generalized category of political identity; this is its true terrain. When considered in

this terrain we can see how the ambiguities, the changeability, the fungibility and interplay of

national identity with other forms of identification can be as subversive of the nation-state as it is

supportive. And within this terrain we can ask if national identification is as privileged over
others as the nation-state and nationalist leaders like to suggest (Duara 1996. 161).

The question of identity in Europe is often presented as a dichotomy between national and European identities.
However, the recognition that multiple identities are overlapping, and not automatically conflicting, means that
each can exist without denying or diminishing the validity of the others. In this respect. Smith poses the crucial
question:

But if the possibility of being intensely French or British and intensely European exists, what
does it mean to feel and be European? Is 'Europe' merely the sum total of its various national

identities and communities? [...] On the other hand, if 'Europe' and 'European' signify
something more than the sum total of the populations and cultures that happen to inhabit a
conventionally demarcated geographical space, what exactly are those characteristics and
qualities that distinguish Europe from anything or anyone else?(Smith 1997, 331)

Is Europe merely the aggregation of identities in a given geographical area? Or is there something which
substantially differentiates Europe from elsewhere? Kaelble and Smith both indicate that there exist several areas

in which to look for similarities: linguistic similarities, cultural geography and territorial symbolism, religious
cleavages, and a common notion ofthe outsider (Smith 1997, 333). In particular, Kaelble notes that similarities in

virtually all areas of life are to be observed across European societies - education systems, legal institutions,
marriage patterns, family structures, work patterns, social service traditions, the arts, leisure habits, consumer

preferences, fashion - allare more similar among European societies than in comparison with other countries such

as the United States, Japan orRussia (Kaelble 1995). These common characteristics do in fact distinguish Europe
as an entity, though the borders are vague and fluid. More significantly, Kaelble observes a convergence among all

of these characteristics, noting that the variegation of European societies has grown closer together, especially
since 1945: politics, economy, mentality and culture have all become more similar in Western Europe (Kaelble
1995. 15ff).

Both Smith and Kaelble come to the conclusion that significant common experiences and distinguishing

characteristics do infact exist, and are slowly coming to the fore as indicators ofa European component to identity.
It is a lengthy and evolutionary process, though, as Smith writes that "we are dealing with shared memories,
traditions, myths, symbols, andvalues, which may possess subtly different meanings and significance for different
10

communities in the area conventionally designated as Europe" (Smith 1997. 333). As noted above, identity is
largely subjective, and the factors which build a common cultural identity are not entirely the subject of pure
positivistic science: quantifying identity is much more difficult than observing it. Even within Europe, not all
Europeans share in all of same the traditions, experiences and memories: "Europe here represents a field

favourable to diffusion and cross-fertilization of cultural traditions, but one of uneven receptivity" (Smith 1997,
334). Different values are likely to find resonance in different geographic and cultural spheres; the true challenge
for Europe, then, will be to find a place between the national identity and the technocratic, scientific "culture" of
early integration—a place where the necessary- link between culture and politics, between the normative framework

and the institutional structure of Europe, can be established such that the integration process willbe legitimated.

TheEuropean Identity: Myth, Construct or Budding Reality?

As noted above, much attention has been paid to the institutional and politico-economic aspects of

integration, and less to the processes taking place on the social and cultural level. On the one hand, this is clearly
because the EU is not endeavoring to create a homogeneous cultural area—indeed, the Amsterdam Treaty and the
Agenda 2000, both emphasize the diversity of an expanded Union as one of the potential benefits to expansion.

However, some attention needs to be paid to the concept of the developing European identity as the EU prepares for

further institutional reform and membership expansion.

Alongside the institutional, economic and political

structures, the EU will certainly impact the lives, perceptions and expectations of the people in the CEECs, just as

the Union has done in the EU 15 states. In light of the professed aims of both the Amsterdam Treaty and the
Agenda 2000—bringing the Union closer to the citizens, and preparing both the Union and potential member

states for the expansion of the Union—it seems particularly appropriate to examine the ideaof European identity in

conjunction with a discussion of the eastward expansion of the Union. The challenges embodied in differing
attitudes, expectations, perceptions, and identities are as significant as those related to institutional and structural

reform. The former, however, are not as easilyovercome by legislationor bureaucratic engineering.
Kaelble, in his discussion of European Consciousness, Society and History (Europabewusstsein,
Gesellschaft undGeschichte), observes the difference between the (politically) planned Europe and the "lived" or

experienced Europe: "...the 'lived'1—the politically unplanned, yet nevertheless practiced and experienced

11

Europe—this means the developments ofeconomy, society, culture and politics on the European level that were

experienced and shaped by contemporaries, but at the same time were not directly reflected as European
developments" (Kaelble 1995, 4, my translation). These tendencies and developments are not typically viewed as

part of the integration process, but are reflective of the real occurrences which influence the integration process.
Kaelble's distinction between the "planned" and the "experienced" Europe is crucial, as it is only in the recent
history ofthe integration process that efforts have been made by the European political elite to reconcile these two
perspectives on European Integration. The recent emphasis on democratic accountability, cultural and social

policy, and the normative aspects ofthe integration process all represent attempts to bring together the values,
traditions and history ofEurope into a Union which is more than justa common economic market.

Discussions ofthe unique characteristics ofEurope—social, economic, cultural and political traits which

distinguish Europe and give it, in some sense, an identity (Kaelble 1995)—have taken on added significance
among scholars, intellectuals and philosophers within the context of the debate concerning the future ofEuropean
integration. As Kaelble states, "In the last few years it has become increasingly clear to European politicians that
the cultural and social sides ofEuropean integration are central to the furtherance ofthe integration project and the
political development of the European Union" (Kaelble 1995, 10, my translation). The fact that the Amsterdam

Treaty addresses such issues, as will be discussed below, demonstrates an increasing awareness among European
politicians that the integration process cannot be carried out by decree and regulation alone—there must be a
connection to the people, not only in democratic accountability, but also in an awareness of the social and cultural

conditions in which the integration process is taking place. At the same time, the creation of the EU, combined

with a history of cooperation and coexistence in Western Europe - an area ravaged by war and divided by
nationalism until just fifty years ago - indicates to some degree the extent to which a common European identity
has begun tocoalesce through the process ofeconomic and political integration. It is the existence ofthis common

identity, however fledgling it may be. that has led the EU to look at the cultural and social spheres alongside the
process of economic and political integration.

Kaelble notes that "The history ofthe European experience—the unconsidered, unplanned, yet already
emerging distinguishing rapprochement of societies and cultures throughout Europe—forms the basis and

fundamental element of the developing European consciousness" (Kaelble 1995. 13, my translation). Four

12

elements in particular make up the European consciousness: the unique commonalties among European societies:
the gradual diminishment of marked differences between European societies: the intertvyining and integration of

European societies in the 20th century; and the shared European experiences in everyday work and leisure
activities—activities which increasingly take place across national borders and without regard to national
boundaries (Kaelble 1995, 13-14). The increased similitude among European societies is to be observed in the
exchange of goods and services, consumer preferences, similarities in art, fashion and science, and even in the

increase in trans-national business joint-ventures, school exchanges and city partnerships (Kaelble 1995, 19). In

short, the everyday experiences of the European people are taking on an increasingly "European" dimension—

international as opposed to national, in work, leisure, shopping, television, music, culture, and so forth. "Europe.
and no longer the individual region or nation, has become the arena for the experiences of the vast majority of
average European citizens" (Kaelble 1995, 23, my translation).

In the European context, the expansion of experiences and interactions with other states and nations has

not removed national or local identifications. On the contrary, these experiences have at least led to a more

realistic estimation of other European cultures and societies: similarities become visible alongside the differences.
trust is built up. dissimilarities are smoothed over, and meaningful connections between states and cultures are

established (Kaelble 1995). Nevertheless, the mere existence of the "experienced Europe" does not mean that the
European experience canbe seen as the sole root ofthe European identity or the single cause for the construction of
European institutions. In certain respects, it is in fact the planned "vision" of Europe that has created the

European identity (Kaelble 1995). In particular, it would be difficult to envision a European identity forming
without the common market andremoval ofbarriers togoods, services andtravel within Europe.
European consciousness and the goal-oriented politics of integration stand in a close
interrelationship with the European experience; the European consciousness has influenced the
European experience, but at the same time, the European consciousness has been strengthened
and reinforced through the European experience. Without the European experience. European
integration would most likely be a technocratic construct, and the European consciousness would
have remained an empty world-view and ideology (Kaelble 1995. 25. my translation).
Similarly, the creation of the Euro as a replacement for national currencies, using generic architectural forms and

non-specific markings on the new currency, has had a significant effect in reinforcing a European identity that is

not linked to any one national myth or history. As is becoming increasingly evident, the envisioned Europe and
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the experienced Europe have interacted with one another and influenced one another, such that the integration
process has developed into something more than simply an institutional construction. Europe does indeed have a

unique identity, and the European identity is not only a part of the individual identity for the citizens of the
European Union, but itlends legitimacy and authenticity to the continuing process ofintegration.

European identity since the end ofWorld War II has developed in such a manner that, as Kriiger notes.

West Europe became the "real" Europe, as the traditions, norms and culture of Western Europe were accepted as
the European identity in full (Kriiger 1995, 48). With the end ofthe Cold War. and more importantly, the rush
towards accession to the EU by the CEECs, this identity as the "only" European identity is being challenged by
neighboring European states whose newly validated national identities are no less legitimate. However, as Girault

indicates, a broader historical perspective reveals the commonalties which exist among all European societies and
traditions: the great movements in science and the arts which characterize European history—"from the
scholasticism ofthe Middle Ages to Surrealism"—were not limited to what is now Western Europe, but stretched
across the entire continent, touching the Atlantic in the West and the very edges ofthe Austrian Empire in the East

(Girault 1995, 72). The idea of Europe as an entity has existed in the collective consciousness for far longer than
any formalizing institutional arrangements (Light 1993). Indeed, a longer view of history reveals ideas of

European unity which existed long before the sequence of events following WWII which gave institutional

expression to this ideal. The Roman Empire united a large portion ofsouthern and western Europe through force,

though the cultural and literary achievements of the Empire brought relative peace and stability to the region,
thereby lent some measure of legitimacy to the conquest. With the spread of Christianity in the Middle Ages, a
semi-defined European civilization could be identified by the area in which the early Christian Church dominated

both belief and politics - the areas under the control of the Holy Roman Empire had much more in common among
themselves than with outside Empires (Boden 1998, 10). Later, Europe saw continued stability and relative unity
under Charlemagne - a period also dominated by the Christian Church. As the hegemony ofthe Roman Catholic

Church in Europe was destroyed in the Reformation, a crucial element in the legitimization of a unified Europe
was also destroyed. Nationalism, accompanied by several centuries of war and fragmentation, attempted to
reestablish a system oflegitimate rule in Europe with only limited success. It is only since the beginning ofthe

20th century that an awareness ofEurope's common cultural and historical heritage has been reawakened, and only
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since the end of WWII that this common history andidentity has been given political and institutional expression.
In lieu of a hegemonic power (or the Roman Catholic Church), though, a democratic civil society (as will be
discussed below) is beginning to emerge across Europe, providing for the expression of common values and ideals
while accommodating the multitude of European cultures and traditions.

Thus it is clear that as the EU develops and expands, extending its membership to include the CEECs will

also require a greatdeal of work to ensure that entire Union rests on a foundation of shared principles and norms.
In the context of the present and future development of the Union, the interplay between the modern European
experience and the political integration process has important implications. The question of how important the
European experience is to the integration process is difficult to quantify, yet is readily discernible. The European

experience (i.e. the European identity) is certainly an important part of the integration process, yet it is partially
absent in the CEECs on account of the Cold War division of Europe. Though the modern European experience
should not become a prerequisite condition for Union membership, the complexity (and difficulty) of the accession
process indicates the importance of adapting the CEECs to the normative framework of the Union.

The experience of the German Unification is indicative of just how daunting the task of integrating the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU may be. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, difficulties

remain in all aspects of the integrationprocess. The costs of integrating the former GDR have been enormous, and

though initial prognostications may have beenoverly optimistic, the fact that the economy still lags far behind the
West is cause for consternation. Massive infusions of capital and transfers into the social system have had

seemingly little effect on high unemployment and structural deficiencies in the economy. Perhaps more disturbing
(and instructive) for the forthcoming enlargement of the EU is the fact that a psychological-cultural gap between
the Eastand West remains. After years of communism in the former East Germany, finding a common identity for
people within the same country has been even moredifficult that reinvigorating economic and political institutions.

Lingering nostalgia for the securities of the GDR. combined with mutual misperceptions and divergent
expectations for a unified Germany, have left Germany informally divided and unsure of its own role. The

instance of German unification poses the question to what extent a collective German identity will develop with
economic development and the elimination of disparities between east and west. When combined with a newgeneration who have had socialization and educational experiences free from communism, restored welfare and
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confidence may well break down the invisible wall which remains between east and west in Germany.

The

experience of German unification suggests that the Union will have to face similar difficulties, albeit on a much

larger scale, in the case of the CEECs. In this respect, the intense educational and civic-mindedefforts extended to

the accession candidates in Central and Eastern Europe will be no less important than the formal political and
economic assistance in laying the foundation for a workable Union.

The fact that the states and societies of Western Europe do in fact share many unique characteristics and

commonalties is significant for the future of European integration. While these characteristics ostensibly made the
states of post-WWII Western Europe uniquely suited to the integration process from the outset, comparatively little
attention has been paid to the simultaneous formation of a European identity, or European consciousness, as part of
the integration process. However, overthe entire history of European integration (beginning even before WWI), a
gradual normative convergence throughout Europe has accompanied and influenced the formation of institutions

and treaties in the European Union. Perceptions about the way things should be, and the way they ought to happen
on the European plane have begun to form another level of identity among the citizens of Europe, and particularly
among the citizens of EU member states. The general convergence of expectations and the recognition of shared
values amongmember states is central to the normative foundation of the integration process.
Though it is difficult to measure such a normative convergence, it is manifested in various forms

throughout the EU. Visible indicators that point to an increasingly meaningful European component to identit>
include: Euro-license plates and flags, an increase in student exchanges, increased inter-European leisure travel,
the overriding European component to nearly all business and economic activity, and the pro-European stance of
all major political parties, when in varying degrees of enthusiasm. Additionally, the "Eurospeak" or "Eurobabblc"
which has become commonplace, though often derided as the "technobabble" of a Brussels elite, indicates that

"Euro-ideas" are gaining increased acceptance among both the political elite and the citizenry.
The numerous reports and surveys of the European Commission, under Directorate-General 10 and the

EUROSTAT office, lend quantitative support to the idea of a common European identity. A general survey of the
values and ideals held by Europeans, the Continuous Tracking Survey (CTS). indicates that people within the EU
15 countries share in large part the same values, even if these are not directly related to (or supportive of) the

integration process. Social welfare and education rank chief among shared ideals: About 8 in 10 Europeans
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believe that it is important to be involved in creating a better society, and a similar number believe that it is

important for people to understand how the EU works (European Commission. Europinion #13). Such values can

be broadly interpreted asa vision for a collective future, as opposed to a national or individualistic conception. In
addition, the topics ofgreatest interest among the European citizenry - citizens rights and the European currency
- are closely related to the ideas of identity and a sense of belonging (European Commission, Europinion #13).

Despite the fact that the EU itself does not always meet with overwhelming support, Europeans do share many
values and ideals about the way society should be structured and what values should be reflected.

In addition, the EUROSTAT andEurobarometer surveys ofattitudes and opinions in the European Union,

thorough surveys conducted over an extended time frame, indicate that a normative convergence and a fledgling
European identity is indeed developing. According to Eurobarometer No. 51, which surveyed European citizens in

March and April of 1999, satisfaction levels in the way democracy works in the EU increased by 7% since the
spring of 1998, such that 42% are satisfied or very satisfied (European Commission, Eurobarometer No. 51, 7).

However, just more than halfof EU citizens (56%) feel attached to Europe, while nearly 9 in 10 feel attached to

their country, town/village, or region—evidence that the European identity component, while extant, is by no
means predominant in comparison to "traditional" identities (European Commission. Eurobarometer No. 51, 8).

Nevertheless, 56% is a fairly large portion ofthe population to develop an attachment to Europe as a whole, when
the relatively short period of integration is compared to the long-standing traditions and cultures of individual
member states.

A series of statistics concerning the policies and priorities if the Union following the Amsterdam Treaty
are also significant to the hypothesis of a normative convergence across Europe. As noted above, the Amsterdam

Treaty is the first time that the fundamental rights and principles of the European Union are provided for in a
Treaty. On the subject, 88% of the Union's citizens support policies which would fight poverty and social
exclusion, and 81% of EU citizens believed that guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the

principles ofdemocracy in Europe should be a priority. Only the fight against unemployment and the fight against
organized crime and drug trafficking received more popular support, (90% and 88% respectively). Additionally.
72% of people feel that bringing the Union closer to European citizens through increased information about the

Union should be a priority (Eurobarometer No. 51, 55). While the ideas of reducing social exclusion, supporting
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individual rights and promoting democracy are admittedly broad (few could object to such ideals), the fact remains

that an overwhelming majority ofthe European population supports such ideals as priorities and policy goals for
the European Union. The ideals might be universal in nature, but the fact that they are supported as policy goals at
the European level reflect some sense ofthe shared norms and ideals which are developing across Europe—a veryimportant component to a collective identity.

Although the Amsterdam Treaty is the first step in internalizing the normative convergence in Europe,
there remains work tobedone in this area. Part of nearly every identity is the definition ofthe "self in relation to

the "other", and in the case ofEurope, there are many ways in which identity is defined in the negative sense.
Kaelble writes that, next to the positive aspects of European identity such as democracy and social security,
economic growth and environmental protection, freedom and increasing regional cohesion, there is also a general

sentiment against non-Europeans—a component ofthe European identity- which exhibits enough ofa xenophobic

bent to cause some consternation (Kaelble 1995, 29). A 1997 European Union Survey revealed an alarmingly
large proportion ofthe population in EU Member States (33%) who described themselves as "quite racist" or "very
racist" (Eurobarometer 47.1, 1). As might be expected, declared levels of racism were higher among those
opposed to European Union membership, though most of the insecurities concerning the presence of minority
groups stemmed more from concern about the limited availability ofsocial benefits and employment opportunities;
the report notes that "...the anxieties expressed by a number ofrespondents seemed to result not so much from the

actual presence ofminority groups but from the perception as to the ability ofthe host country to accommodate

them" (Eurobarometer 47.1, 6). It is noteworthy, though, that 84% called for the strengthening of actions by the
European Union to combat racism, and nearly 60% viewed education and "the teaching of mutual acceptance in
schools" as the key to combating racism and xenophobia in Europe (Eurobarometer 47.1, 8). Once again, the fact
that a European (as opposed to national) solution to problems of xenophobia and social exclusion is favored

indicates not only a common identification ofproblems and solutions, but also a recognition that certain ideals and
norms should prevail across Europe andbe dealt with at the European level.

The European identity is still weak in many areas, and it has not been exhaustively researched in

conjunction with the investigations into economic convergence and political union. Instead ofbeing viewed as a

unique, additional layer ofidentification which enriches all ofthe others, the collective European identity is often
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seen asinsubstantial when compared with national orother levels ofidentity. Nevertheless, the European identity

has the potential to develop into a powerful unifying force and an asset to the integration process. The flip side,
however, is that the integration process must continually involve the citizen; if it remains an elite-driven process,
there is little chance that the European identity will ever fully develop. In such a case, it could well become an

obstacle to full integration—an object of derision and target for the frustrations associated with European
integration. Such tendencies are already exhibited in the gradual rise of right-wing extremist political parties in
nations across Europe. All of these parties share a intense anti-European attitude, along with xenophobic and
nationalist tendencies.

The formation and nurture ofa European identity is a crucial aspect ofthe integration process. Identity is
not as easily engineered as the Common Market, and it cannot be legislated and regulated into existence. The

European Identity canonly becultivated andencouraged, yet without thiscohesive element ofthe European Union,
there is little chanceof anchoring a democratic, civil-society in the CEECs. Political and economic assistance arc

short-term fixes, but they arenot a long-term solution to truly integrating the CEECs into the European Union.

New Forms ofIdentity: European Civil Society

The bleak no-mans land between a predominant national identity and the hollow idea of a European
identity explored by Smith is not necessarily as devoid of possibility as might appear to be the case. The idea of a

European civil society is receiving increasing attention as a viable means to link the citizens of Europe with
European processes and politics.

The civil society model would account for the changing nature of the

international landscape, and befits both the multiplicity of identities and the developing normative frameyvork in
the European Union.

By recognizing the diversity of the Union in a common context which focuses on

participation andinvolvement in the political process, the civil society model would provide an appropriate vehicle
for the political expression of European values.

In this respect, the XVII European Symposium on Science and Culture, marking the 50th Anniversary of
the College of Europe, investigated the forces driving societal chance in Europe with a specific focus on the link

between culture and politics in the European Union.2 A discussion paper prepared for the conference, entitled The
Transition to a Knowledge Society and its Implications for the European Social Model, highlights several
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important implications for identity and European integration. Notably, the paper affirms the central importance of
a common future vision for Europe, stating that

The European social model has become a recognisable and meaningful idea—its diverse and
practical forms in different parts of the Union notwithstanding... As an ideal, it is founded on a
set of shared values which combine a democratic social order (rooted in unconditional support for
individual dignity and liberty, respect for human rights, the rule of law and freedom of
expression) with an open economy (in which free market forces are accompanied by regulatory
mechanisms to assure social solidarity and cohesion). This ideal has once more taken clearer

shape in the decades since 1945, but it essentially represents the continuation ofa long historical
process ofeconomic and social convergence in Europe—a process that ultimately rests upon the
common cultural heritage of its peoples and their countries (European Commission and the
College of Europe, 1. my emphasis).

This affirmation of not only the common European heritage (a central factor in common cultural identity, as
discussed above), but of the normative convergence which has characterizedEuropean society for the past 50 years.

reflects the growingawareness that European identity is a central element to the ongoing process of integration.
In order to recognize and incorporate European identity into the integration process, the Symposium

discussion paper underscores the heuristic potential inherent in the civil society model, noting that the "...future-

oriented vision for the European social model places the concept of a civil society at centre-stage—a society based
on mutual solidarity and framed by social and political arrangements which encourage participation and

commitment on a broad basis" (European Commission and the College of Europe, Discussion Paper, 1). A civil
society model would focus on encouraging transnational associations, and promoting increased communicationand
understanding between cultures and traditions through a set of acceptable behaviors based on the common norms

and values of the integration process (i.e. respect for democratic processes and fundamental rights). As such, the
model would be well-suited to combating the increasing social exclusion, xenophobia, and extremism which are
surfacing in European society as reactions to the integration process.

The changing nature of societal relationships and normative structures indicates the necessity for
innovative solutions to the problem of political participation and identity at the European level, and the civil
society model offers a new context for social action and identity expression appropriate to the changing nature of
society. "The emergence of a more inclusive and participatory model of society would undoubtedly provide added
value for Europe through the greater collective engagement of citizens in issues of general societal interest
transcending national frontiers" (European Economic and Social Committee, Press Release No. 95/99).

The

strength and legitimacy of democracy in the integrated Europe of the future will rest on how well the citizens are
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represented—not simply through electoral mechanisms, but through the yvide range of organizations and interest
associations which characterize a healthy participatory system and work to combat social exclusion.
Given the need for a meaningful expression of the European identity in the political process, combined

with the changing nature of society in Europe, the civil society model necessarily focuses on education and access
to information as central elements to forming a cohesive social model of participation. It is only yvith education,
knowledge, access to information, and the capacity for lifelong learning that the citizens of Europe will be able to

actively participate in society and the political process. In essence, education creates a level playing field and equal
opportunity for all citizens. The paper notes that this is also the foundation "...in which the shared values that

underpin the European model of society - solidarity, openness, tolerance and the spirit of initiative - are lived and
reaffirmed..." (European Commission and the College of Europe, Discussion Paper, 4-5). Central to the entire

development of a European civil society is the formation of an active, informed citizenry which has a stake in
participation, out of which will develop the vision of a common future, critical to identity formation. "[Education]
is the foundation stone for economic prosperity, but no less for the maintenance of social cohesion and the gradual
emergence of a Europe with which its citizens will want to engage and hence, to accept as a dimension of their
identities" (European Commission and the College of Europe. Discussion Paper, 5, my emphasis).
In the realm of social cohesion, civil society and education, public opinion across the European Union is
largely supportive of the ideas expressed in the symposium discussion paper. Education levels across Europe and
the knowledge people have about the European Union are significant to the changing nature of society in Europe
and the emerging civil society. Eurobarometer No. 51 notes that, with an EU 15 average score of 4.20 on a selfperceived knowledge scale of 1 to 10 (with 1 representing no knowledge and 10 signifying a great deal of

knowledge), "The large majority of Europeans continue to perceive their knowledge level of European Union
affairs as relatively low...only 24% of EU citizens feel they know quite a lot to a great deal about the European
Union" (Eurobarometer No. 51, 10). The survey also indicates that "...opinion leaders, managers, people yvho

stayed in full-time education the longest and the most frequent users of the media are the groups that give
themselves the highest score on the self-perceived knowledge scale" (Eurobarometer No. 51, 11). Moreover, the
Eurobarometer Reports have found consistent statistical correlations between education levels and levels of support

for EU policies. EU membership, and satisfaction levels yvith the Union: 64% of people who left full-time
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education aged 20 or older support their country's membership, compared to only 40% ofthose who left school at

age 15 or younger; 71% ofthose who feel they know a lot about the EU support their country's membership, while
only 36% of those who feel they know very little support membership (Eurobarometer No. 51. 26). An
encouraging trend, in this respect, is the consistently high support for teaching about the European Union in

schools, with 84% ofthe citizenry supporting such education (Eurobarometer No. 51. 57). However, only 32% of
Europeans favor EU decision making over national jurisdiction in areas such as social, cultural and education

policy (Eurobarometer No. 51, 54). Thus there may be some difficulties in creating a single standard ofeducation
concerning the European Union. All the same, these findings are central to the hypothesis that education and

information are the key to developing an informed, participatory norm for the European civil society.

The gradually expanding competencies ofthe Union in cultural affairs also has an important role to play

in the formation ofa European civil society. Article 128 ofthe Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides the
basis for Union action in the cultural sphere, which aims to: "...contribute to the flowering of cultures in the
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common
cultural heritage to the fore; to encourage contemporary cultural action; and to foster cooperation between the
Member states and with non-member countries and international organisations" (European Commission, DG X

Overview). The three main cultural programs ofthe EU (Kaleidoscope, for artistic and cultural activities, Ariane,

for books and reading and Raphael, devoted to cultural heritage) all share three priorities: cooperation between
actors in the cultural sector, especially in the exchange ofinformation, experience and knowledge; public access to
and participation in culture; and the promotion ofartistic creation and cultural heritage. (European Commission,

Communication from the Commission, 4). Areview of these initial efforts to promote culture on the European
level revealed only partial successes in establishing a permanent framework for transnational cultural activity: as a

result a new Culture 2000 program was adopted to "...develop Europeans' shared cultural heritage by promoting
cooperation between creative artists, cultural players and cultural institutions in the Member States" (European
Commission. DG XOverview). The goal is to encourage connections between people, and not just institutions.
Pertinent to the investigation of European civil society, it is interesting to note the confluence of methods

and goals in the discussion ofcultural activity as compared to the civil society paper. A Communication paper
from the European Commission on the role ofculture notes that "...the concept also covers popular culture, mass-
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produced culture, everyday culture. The broadening ofthe definition is a consequence ofthe fact that culture is no

longer considered a subsidiary- activity but a driving force in society, making for creativity, vitality, dialogue and
cohesion. It is therefore intrinsic to any response to the major challenges that we face today. (European
Commission. Communicationfrom the Commission, 1, my emphasis). The communication goes on to note that
...cultural action must help express a European citizenship based on a knowledge and mutual
comprehension of European cultures and an awareness of the features common to such cultures;

[...] The European Union preserves the identities and the cultural rights ofeach community; the
public need not consider the Union as something which dilutes their cultural identities, but rather
as something which guarantees the existence and flowering of their cultures. (European
Commission, Communicationfrom the Commission, 1).

While clearly recognizing the fear among individual communities that the EU will rob individuals and Member

States oftheir specific identities, the Commission emphasizes the role which culture can play in ensuring social
cohesion and minimizing the exclusion ofgroups within the EU. All the same, it will be a delicate balancing act

for Brussels to promote cultural advancement and reduce social exclusion without overstepping the perceived
bounds ofthe Union competency in this area, as a majority ofEU citizens favor national decision-making in areas
such as cultural and social policy.

Compared to other areas, Union activity in the cultural sphere is relatively undeveloped. In order to give
rise to a true civil society in Europe, networks ofcooperation and exchange ofideas on the European level must

develop into permanent forms ofcommunication and interaction—a process which is proceeding slowly, at best.
The Commission Communication entitled Towards a Europe of Knowledge (2000-2006) cites as part of the

Union's educational and training policy three specific priorities with cultural dimensions: knowledge, citizenship
and competence. Future programs such as Socrates II, Leonardo Da Vinci II and Youth for Europe IV will focus
on promoting cultural exchange and educational training (European Commission, Explicit Integration, 5).
Overall, the experience of the cultural and educational exchanges thus far indicates a fertile environment

for civil society development in Europe. Amature European civil society yvould be well suited to preserving the
unique and diverse cultures of the various European nations yvhile affording a common framework for public
participation and expression of values at the European level. In recognizing and incorporating diversity as a
component of the European identity, rather than trying to homogenize the myriad of cultures and traditions of

Europe, the civil society model provides a common normative framework for the expression of these cultures and
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traditions in the European context. A civil society model would not displace national identity in Europe, as many
opponents would seem to suggest, but would allow individual, local, national and European identities their fullest

expression inside a framework of shared norms and mutual respect. Moreover, public sentiment approves of Union

policies which create opportunities for public participation. The Union's mixed record of public approval is by no
means an unconditional endorsement ofcurrent EU priorities andpolicies, yet it is far from an outright rejection.
Public opinion is fickle, and though EU policy is certainly not based on the Eurobarometer survey alone,

some important trends should be pointed out. Most importantly, the support for a Union role in addressing the
fundamental rights of the Union and combating social exclusion represent a common normative framework (the
way people believe things should be) reflective of values shared across the European Union. Furthermore, the
importance attached to education and information exchange reflect a desire to connect with the Union and

participate in the policy process. The division in self-perceived knowledge levels and the associated correlation

with support for the EU are a critically important indicator of the significance of education and access to

information for the formation of a shared body of values and norms which will support a European identity and
civil society. There can be no clearer message as to the importance and urgency for Union action on this front:

increased information, increased transparency and increased attention to educational issues will only increase
levels of support and involvement. It is apparent from the Eurobarometer survey that the current EU methods of

communication, education and information exchange are not very effective: less than 4 in 10 European citizens
feel well informed about the European Union (European Commission, Europinion #13). Most citizens are unable

to answer basic questions concerning the role ofvarious Union institutions or the breakdown of Union budgetary
expenditures (Eurobarometer No. 51). Finally, most citizens are unable to say whether they trust EU institutions
because they lack an opinion (Eurobarometer No. 51, 49). Despite the many forms of information available, there

has not been a sufficient connection to the citizens of the Union; a profusion of information sources is relatively
useless if none of the information actually makes it to the citizen.

Though public opinion is only beginning to find expression, the EU has been lethargic in responding to
the demand for increased transparency and accountability.

The principles which yvere reaffirmed in the

Amsterdam Treaty will continue to be central in cementing the link between the Union and the citizen and

bringing the Union closer to the people. While European identity and civil society are not yet mature, the fact that
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many problems facing the member states are perceived and addressed as European problems, along yvith solutions
which are envisioned and supported on the European level, should not be overlooked. Clearly, education is a

central factor to ensuring to the social cohesion and the process of political socialization in Europe which will
serve to reinforce and strengthen the core norms of the European Union: democracy, and respect for fundamental

freedoms and human rights. Similarly, educational and cultural exchanges have been important elements of the
pre-accession strategies for the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and these programs have likely been most

effective in shaping perceptions and opinions about Europe through infusion of the nonns upon which the

integration process is built.3 People tend to support the EU and the integration process if they understand it and
are informed.

As a result, the EU will only find increased acceptance through an associated increase in

transparency, accountability and education. An increased understanding of the Union will also serve to strengthen
theparticipatory civil-society culture which will evolve through an informed, involved citizenry.
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Institutional Reform and the EU Member States

European Identity and the EU Member States

In light of the fact that a European identity, or the awareness ofa shared normative basis in Europe, can
be saidto exist and interact with the formal, institutional process of integration, it is worthwhile to examine the

interplay between these two conceptions of Europe. Through the interplay of norms and institutions, much of the
seemingly irrational or inexplicable behavior of states in the EU can be clarified. At the same time, the addition of

a normative dimension to traditional analyses of integration provides a more comprehensive theoretical framework

for explaining the integration process and predicting future developments. Additionally, the significance of the
central documents of the integration process—the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Agenda
2000—can only befully appreciated when the dynamic surrounding the normative aspects ofEuropean integration
are included in the analysis.

Katzenstein, in his analysis of Germany's role in the European Union, notes that "Norms and identities

typically have two effects. They constitute actors and thus shape their interests. And they constrain actor

preferences" (Katzenstein 1997, 3). It is important to keep these two elements in mind when examining the

behavior of actors and the institutional development of the European Union.

The process of European

integration—over fifty years of shared experiences and common interests in Western Europe—have shaped the
preferences and interests of all the actors in the EU, and served to define their behavior such that it is consistent

with the wider European identity in many respects. As Katzenstein notes, "What may seem irrational for [states]
as individuals can be quite rational from the perspective of the family, with yvhich they identify" (Katzenstein
1997. 3-4). The same sort of effect on assumptions, interests and choice of action can be attributed to the

institutional framework (the EU itself) within which the actors (the EU member states) operate. Hence, the

interaction between the actors and the institution parallels the interplay between the normative European
awareness and the institutional structure of the Union; the European experience influences the course of planned
European integration, and vice-versa.

Such a two-way relationship is not inconsistent with recent theories

concerning the behavior of international organizations and institutions. Indeed, rather than presuming a simple
one-way process of causality, a theoretical model which takes into account the interplay between actors and

institutions on one hand, and norms and institutions on the other, provides a much more comprehensive (and
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powerful) paradigm for analysis of a phenomenon so complex as European integration. It is becoming increasingly
evidentthat institutions created by a group of political actors (such as the sovereign states of the European Union),

after establishment and internalization into the behavior of the founding actors, begin to influence the assumptions,
interest calculations, and even the identities of the founding actors.

The EU, as an institution, has played a central role in altering the preferences and calculations of interest

undertaken by various actors within the Union. Both states and sub-state actors, such as regional and local
governments or interest groups, have added the "European Dimension" to decision making processes and

calculations of interest. Krasner and Rittberger refer to this phenomena as a "feedback mechanism" whereby an
institution may develop to the point where it begins to influence the preferences and interests of the sovereign
states which created the institution in the first place: "Once principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures are entrenched they may alter the egoistic interests and power configurations that led to their creation

in the first place" (Krasner 1983, 361). International organizations or institutions in effect act as inputs into the
decision-making processes of actors, as well as being part of the policy outcome mechanisms.

In the case of the EuropeanUnion, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) provides an instructive exampleof
just how an institution has worked to change the norms and values within the structure which created it in the first

place. The judicial activism of the ECJ has been one of the driving forces behind the course and pace of the
integration process. Originally envisioned in the Treaty of Rome as a purely regulatory body, the ECJ was to be
responsible for overseeing the implementation of EU directives in a manner similar to conventional international

law (i.e. by imposing obligations on states) (Wincott 1996. 170ff). However, a series of rulings early in its
existence served to establish the principle now known as direct effect, whereby Community legislation is deemed
applicable without the intervening step of national implementing legislation. This process has been referred to as

the "constitutionalising" of the Treaty of Rome (Wincott 1996). and has been significant in moving the EU away
from a set of intergovernmental agreements and toyvard a true integration process yvhich has involved the transfer

of national sovereignty to the Community level. At the same time, the principle of supremacy has evolved through
the case history of the ECJ such that "...the Court declared that EC law was supreme over domestic law. despite
the fact that the Treaty of Rome did not contain a supremacy clause" (Wincott 1996, 173). Originally created as

an institution to mediate disputes betweensovereign states, the activist stance taken by the ECJ has helped to guide
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the course of European integration into a loose federalist structure without serious challenge from the member
states. As Wallace notes, the legal and institutional structure of the Union owes a great deal to the ECJ. Overall,

the ECJ has widened the basis for European politics and policy-making, and at the same time strengthened the
capacity of European institutions for action—especially that of the Commission (Wallace 1996, 154). Of course,
the Court has not acted entirely alone; interaction with the other institutions and the member states has been

important in the evolutionof the EU. and there is some debate on whether the ECJ merely reflected the interests of
the most powerful actors in helping steer the EU towards a federalist structure. Nevertheless, the fact remains that

the ECJtook a leading role, and as an institution worked to change the accepted norms for an entire group of states
within a framework of international cooperation.

In the context of the entire European Union, Katzenstein observes: "...the important thing about
institutions, at least in this setting, is not that they enhance efficiency but that they offer a normative context that

constitutes actors and provides a set of norms in which the reputation of actors acquires meaning and value"
(Katzenstein 1997, 12-13). Neither the process of European (institutional) integration, nor the unfolding of a
common normative framework and subsequent normative convergence can be adequately explained from a

traditional realist or liberal theoretical perspective. However, when the process of European integration is vieyved
through an institutional perspective, it becomes possible to account for both individual state behavior and collective

behavior within the Union.

As Katzenstein notes, "Institutions make certain political realities more or less

natural" (Katzenstein 1997, 15), suchthat what might appearto be irrational behavior on the part of any individual
state can be understood as a rational, logical, and even self-evident choice when the institutional framework in

which the actor is operating is taken into account. A prime (and oft-cited) example in this instance would be
Germany's willingness to surrender monetary sovereignty in favor of the Euro—a decision which resulted in a loss

of absolute and relative power when viewed from either a realist or a (neo)liberal perspective, but which is fully
understandable when viewed from the perspective of a common normative frameyvork provided by the European
Union. Through the mediating function of institutions, based on certain commonly accepted norms, answers to
political questions become self-evident in light of past experience and the common value structure.

Numerous scholars have observed the uncertainty-reducing and trust-building effects which takes place
among actors operating within an institutional framework over time (Hasenclever et. al., 1987). However, as
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Katzenstein points out. a sociological-institutional analysis (i.e. one that accounts for the shared normative

framework which develops inside ofan institutional arrangement such as the EU) reveals the depth and extent of
the feedback process which takes place within the institution: "...the central insight of a sociologically inclined
analysis highlights the importance of 'thick' identity-forming effects of institutions, as opposed to their 'thin'
uncertainty-reducing effects" (Katzenstein 1997, 15). Along these lines, Deutsch pioneered the first wave of

communications theories concerning European integration in the 1950s, and Haas' neo-functionalist theory of
integration, while inadequate in other respects, does in fact postulate a normative convergence as one of the

hallmarks of the integration process. Haas recognized the process of European integration as being more
significant than any end point: we do not necessarily know where the integration project will end, but what

happens along the way (e.g. change in norms and identities) is ofgreat importance for the shape ofEurope in the
future. "As the process ofintegration proceeds, it is assumed that values will undergo change, that interests will be

redefined in terms of regional rather than a purely national orientation and that the erstwhile set of separate
national group values will gradually be superseded by a new and geographically larger set of beliefs (Haas 1958.

quoted in Cram 1996, 45). Haas also points to a two-way process of integration. "Although the attitudes of

national political elites would influence the development of the integration process, supranational political elites

also had a role to play inencouraging the process ofintegration [...] It was through a complex interaction ofbelief
systems that Haas envisioned that the reorientation of the activities of national political elites, in response to
European-centered interests and aspirations, would take place" (Cram 1996. 45).

It is therefore essential to take the normative component into consideration, such that integration
processes, national and European identities, and interests are all understood as constantly interacting. In this
respect, more recent interdependence theory has captured heretofore neglected elements of the integration process

in recognizing a dynamic in international organizations and international cooperation "...not solely attributable to

the interests of nation states" (Cram 1996. 50).4 In contrast, early neo-functionalist theories vieyved European
integration as an isolated process, neglecting the larger international environment and factors such as the Cold

War division of Europe which contributed substantially to the creation of a set of relatively homogenous norms

across Western Europe. The limitations of early integration theory reinforces the importance of considering the
whole picture, rather than forcing such a complex process into a single paradigm. Cram points out that more
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recent theories of European integration recall not only Hass' argument concerning participation at the European

level and the alteration of the perceptions which national elites held of their own interests, but also emphasize
"...the development of shared identity, norms and behaviour patterns developed within the context of an
international regime..." (Cram 1996, 52). More specifically.
membership in the EC has become part of the interest calculation for governments and societal
groups. In other words, the national interests of EC states do not have independent existence;
they are not formed in a vacuum and then brought to Brussels. Those interests are defined and
redefined in an international and institutional context that includes the EC. (Sandholtz 1993,
quoted in Cram 1996, 53).

With the progression of the integration process and the expansion of Union competencies into nearly
every facet of European politics, it is also necessary to distinguish between integration processes on the one hand,

andgovernance within the EU on the other. Through the influence of identity and shared norms on the integration
process, the EU itselfhas become a "norm" in certain respects, such that "...it is important to focus, not simplv on

the process through which major institutional change takes place in the EU, but also on the 'day to day"
functioning of the EU as a polity" (Cram 1996, 53). In recognizingthe "daily role" of the Union, scholars here arc

affirming the notion of the European experience referred to by Kaelble.

The fact that the EU is seen and

experienced as a daily reality by many European citizens serves as a poyverful reminder to the viability of a civil

society model in Europe, such that the daily governance of the EU is legitimated through citizen participation and
democratic accountability.

Thus while Deutsch's communications theory and Haas' neo-functionalism have both been shown to be

inadequate in explaining the complex behavior of states in the integration process, their emphasis on the
indispensable normative aspect of integration and international cooperation laid the groundwork for the modernday comprehensive approach to integration theory:

Shorn of behavioralism, the sociological perspective is alive and well in contemporary theories of
international relations generally, and in the analysis of European integration specifically. In
international relations theory, both on questions of national security and political economy, the
sociological perspective seeks to link the materialism and rationalism of mainstream theorizing
to the processes of communication and social discourse that constitute actors and help define
their interests (Katzenstein 1997. 16).

In accounting for the interplay between the common norms which have developed through European integration
and the institutions which have been created, a sociological-institutional framework such as that advanced by
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Katzenstein provides a comprehensive model which accounts for the two crucial themes of the integration process
which were explicitly- addressed in the Amsterdam Treaty and Agenda 2000.
In the end, though, high politics and low politics, institutional change and daily governance,
intergovernmental agreements and sectoral spill-over, are all interrelated in the process of integration and
convergence taking place throughout Europe. Marked by an interaction between states and institutions within a

shared normative framework, the processes of convergence in Europe have created an environment of cooperation
characterized by increased trust and reduced uncertainty among all actors across sectors and through levels of
governance. Cram notes that the very environment of decision making in Europe has changed over the past 50
years, such that "... it is crucial to take into account the learning and adaptation processes, which iterated contact
between the various actors in the policy-making process has made possible..." (Cram 1996, 55). The continued
iteration of decision-making and policy formation within the shared normative framework of European integration
will strengthen the cooperative approach, contributing to the development of a European identity and to the
acceptance of the European Union.

Expressions ofthe European Identity in Member States: Regionalism and Subsidiarity

The growth of a European identity and the accompanying normative convergence among European
countries has had important ramifications for both identity and policy formation within the individual member
states.

The diminishing importance of the nation-state ideal in Europe, and the demands for an inclusive,

participatory civil society at the European level have combined to produce two outgrowths of the integration
process which are also manifestations of the European identity: a surge in the importance of regions and the focus

on the subsidiarity principle5 as a means to connect Europe to the citizens. Regionalism is significant for both
identity and policy, as European regions have become an increasingly dynamic component to identity and. in
accordance with the subsidiarity principle, an important level for citizen participation and the implementation of
EU policy. Although regions remain largely arbitrary constructions throughout Europe (only a few member states

possess a well-defined federal structure, and there is no official EU definition of "region"), there is an important
trend to be observed in the "regionalization" of EU policy. The Maastricht Treaty formalized the position of the
Committee of Regions as an official Union body tasked with providing local and regional authorities representation

31

and an opportunity for input to the European political process (Committee of the Regions. 1995). The affirmation
of democratic accountability and of the subsidiarity principle in the Amsterdam Treaty highlighted the growing

importance of regional and local identification with respect to the stated aim of bringing the Union "closer to the
citizen". Not surprisingly, the growing importance of regional identification has accompanied the increase in
Union activity administered at the regional or local level, as per the principle of subsidiarity. This change in the
dynamic of governance within the Union has powerful implications for the future structure of the Union.

As the European nation state is less able to oversee the economic, political and social processes yvhich

were once linked together within a defined area under the rubric of national sovereignty, European integration and
regional development can be seen as efforts to regain control of these processes. The transition to a comprehensive
system of governance is affecting areas where the national state traditionally found its legitimization. "The nation
as a political and social community is disconnecting from the state as provider of security and welfare. Both nation
and state have lost coherence, as borders have become more permeable, national myths harder to maintain, ethnic

diversity more evident, personal prosperity more dependent on local or transnational factors than on national
protection" (Wallace 1997, 45). As the link between state and society becomes more tenuous in Europe, the
various regions of Europe are becoming more important in the assumption of once "national roles" now fulfilled
through the implementation of EU policy. "European integration and regionalism must be seen not merely in
negative terms, as forces undermining the state, but also as attempts to create new political arenas at the
supranational and sub-national level to try and recapture control of at least some of these processes" (Keating and
Hooghe 1996, 218). The Commission has played an notable role in mobilizing the regional interests through the
use of structural funds and other instruments of regional policy which have bypassed state governments in seeking

to resolve socio-economic disparities throughout Europe (Keating and Hooghe 1996. 223). The Union financial
framework for 1994-1999 committed ECU 154.5 billion (1/3 of the Community budget for this period) to

Structural Funds, under which half of the Union population was covered in some way (Inforegio: Funds);
structural operations accounted for 41% of Union expenditure in 1999 (Eurobarometer No. 51. 16).

In the same way that the Amsterdam Treaty sets out to bring the Union closer to the people through

regional policy, it affirms the principle of subsidiarity as one means of assuring that the EU bureaucracy does not
run rampant over the citizen. A Union publication entitled TheAmsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide notes
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that a specific protocol on subsidiarity has been annexed to the EC Treaty in an effort to bring the Union closer to
its citizens and ensure that decisions are taken as close to the citizen as possible (European Commission, The
Amsterdam Treaty). The subsidiarity principle has guided this course of action, such that the Commission has

sought to involve local and regional interests as much as possible, and ensure that decisions and implementation of

EU policytake place as close to the citizen as possible. Public opinion support for the principle of subsidiarity was
fairly high in the latest Eurobarometer survey, with 62% of the European citizens agreeing that the "EU should be
responsible only for matters which national, regional and local governments can not deal with" (European

Commission, Eurobarometer No. 51, 57). Kriiger notes that the ever-increasing competencies of the Union
threaten to increase the separation of the individual from the political decision making process and centers of
power in Europe. In part, this is the reason that the question of the future development of the Union has been
connected to the debate over regionalism as a new form of European identity, in hopes that the European regions

will form a more direct link to the Union. Regional diversity could well be used to encourage greater participation
through identification with a local, personal piece of the European whole (Kriiger 1995, 52-53). In this manner

the multiple levels of identity in Europe are clearly identifiable, and at the same time, it is evident that a European
awareness is an increasingly important part of identity.

As indicated above in the discussion concerning the European civil society, a stronger regional dimension
has the potential to play a central role in overcoming shortcomings in transparency and democratic accountabilih

Through the promotion of regional initiatives and networking between the Commission and individual regions, the
Commission has achieved a greater degree of citizen contact and acceptance, especially in economically depressed
areas where EU structural funds offer the prospect of an improved future (Junne 1996, 528). Since European
citizens tend to exhibit strong local/regional attachments—nearly 9 in 10 citizens feel "very" or "fairly" attached to
their region, compared to 56% attachment to Europe (European Commission, Eurobarometer No. 51. 8)—the

potential for public participation and involvement at the regional level is becoming a pivotal element in the
solution to Europe's democracy issues. In this respect, the subsidiarity principle should allow for a wider range of
localized decision making processes, thereby taking advantage of the diversity yvhich characterizes European
culture and society (Boldt 1995).

The process of institutional change in the European Union has worked to

encourage the dual processes of 'Europeanization' and 'regionalization'. such that the competencies and influence
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of the traditional European nation state is gradually being eroded. While the two "neyy" forms of identity at the

European and regional level (supranational vs. sub-national) may appear contradictory on the surface, the fact
remains that both have been encouraged and fostered through the process of European integration. The linkage of
regional activity in Europe to the EU illustrates the role both processes play as part of the growing European
component to identity and enhanced legitimacy of the European idea.
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Looking to the Future

Institutional Reform: The Amsterdam Treaty andthe European Identity
The ongoing process of integration and continual reform of the EU institutional structure has led to the

institutionalization of certain norms in the EU treaties. These norms are typically rooted in the broader European
identity, such that the de facto normative convergence across Europe is beginning to find formal expression in the
EU institutional structure, and is in fact driving reform in many instances. In turn, the norms enshrined in the EU

treaties have helped to simplify decision making processes in European politics, such that certain questions have

solutions which are self-evident inside of the normative framework (e.g. the EU should expand to incorporate the
CEECs). In this respect, the Amsterdam Treaty, widely touted as the "citizens treaty", was a large step toward
institutionalizing the norms and values shared across European citizens. As a Commission communication notes.

"Among the political and psychological difficulties, the Commission stresses the perceived distance between the

Union and its citizens. The Treaty of Amsterdam will help to narrow this gap by strengthening the idea of a
'citizen's Europe'" (European Commission. Commission Publishes its Communication, 1).

The Treaty of

Amsterdam affirms, for the first time, the common principles upon which the EU is founded: "The Treaty of
Amsterdam clarifies Article 6 (ex Article F) of the Treaty on European Union...by stating unequivocally that the
Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and

the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States" (European Commission, The Treaty of
Amsterdam). The fact that the Amsterdam Treaty is the first specific declaration of these principles is significant:

it reflects a shift from the earlier sectoral focus on the founding treaties to a more comprehensive approach to
"Europe" and what it means to be a member of the EU.

The shift in focus is also reflected in a new policy area which is transferred from national jurisdiction to

Union administration: justice and home affairs were, under the Maastricht Treaty, solely the responsibility of
Member States, yet now it is within the scope of EU power to make determinations of infractions and injustices
against the aforementioned principles (European Commission. The Treaty ofAmsterdam). The shifting ofjustice
and home affairs (JHA) and internal security concerns from the area of intergovernmental coordination under the

Maastricht Treaty to joint EU decision-making under the Amsterdam Treaty signifies the increasing importance
and relevance of social concerns to Union governance. By allowing for "the gradual establishment of an area of
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freedom, security and justice." an issue of paramount importance to the citizens of the Union has been addressed

(European Commission, The Treaty of Amsterdam).

As intergovernmental cooperation is superseded by the

Community Method in areas such as JHA. such cooperation becomes institutionalized and. as a result, internalized
as a European norm. The increased transparency and attention given to an issue so very near to the daily lifeof the
European citizen is also an important step in improving the democratic accountability of the EU.
In addition to addressing the issue of justice and home affairs, the Amsterdam Treaty takes up the central

issue of citizenship in the EU. The Maastricht Treaty stated that any national of a Member State is a citizen of the

Union, yet some confusion resulted from the implication that Union membership superseded or replaced national
(European Commission, The Treaty ofAmsterdam). In clarifying the issue of citizenship, the Amsterdam Treaty
states that "The aim of European citizenship is to strengthen and consolidate European identity by greater

involvement of the citizens in the Community integration process" (European Commission. The Treaty of

Amsterdam). The recognition of a collective identity in the Treaty has important implications for the development
and awareness of the common principles of the Union. The Amsterdam Treaty outlines four specific areas or

rights conferred to citizens of the Union: freedom of movement and residence throughout the Union; the right to
vote and stand as a candidate at municipal elections and in elections in the European Parliament in the state of

residence: protection bythe diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State where the State of which the

person is a national is not represented in a non-member country, the right to petition the European Parliament and
apply to the European Ombudsman (European Commission. The Treaty of Amsterdam). These rights, though
limited in comparison to the rights conferred by national citizenship, are significant in that they represent the latest
development in an evolving process of bringing the Union to the citizen.

Similarly, the Amsterdam Treaty consolidates and strengthens the rights of Union citizens in the area of

social policy. "These fundamental social rights mainly concern employment, living and working conditions, social
protection, social dialogue and the combating of exclusion" (European Commission. The Treaty of Amsterdam).
The Treaty reaffirms the fact that social policy is a competence which is shared with the Member States, and as

such remains primarily under the purview of national governments. Nonetheless, the role of the Union in social

policy and domestic affairs has been expanded through the incorporation of the 1992 Social Agreement in the
Amsterdam Treaty.
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The European Community can noyv act or reinforce its action in the following areas:
improvement of the working environment to protect workers" health and safety; working
conditions; information and consulation of workers; integration of persons excluded from the
labour market; equality between men and women...[and] the Amsterdam Treaty adds the
possibility of adopting initiatives specifically designed to combat social exclusion
(European Commission. The Treaty ofAmsterdam).

European public opinion favors an expanded Union role in this respect, as 90% of EU citizens believe that the fight
against unemployment should be a priority for the Union, and 88% would favor a Union role in the fight against

poverty and social exclusion (Eurobarometer No. 51, 55). In relation to the idea of a European identity, concerns
about social exclusion represent a sense of "belonging together" in taking a collective approach to social problems.

The Union is gradually assuming some of the functions traditionally associated with citizenship in the European
welfare state.

While the Maastricht treaty focused primarily on institutional reforms for the sake of improved efficiency,
the reforms introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty and subsequently discussed in the Commission's Agenda 2000

concentrate on increasing the legitimacy of Union institutions in their relationship to the citizens of Europe. In
addressing the concerns of democratic accountability, reforms have sought to bring more legitimacy to the
"distant" institutions such as the Commission and the Council yvithout compromising efficiency or falling back on

strictly national representation at the European level. While the European Parliament has been granted many neyy

powers and areas of responsibility in the policy process, the core of governance in the Union still rests with the
close relationship between the Council and the Commission (Wallace 1996. 158). a situation of central concern to

the question of democratic legitimacy in the Union.

Wallace notes that this relationship poses a particularly

challenging barrier to democratic accountability: the Commission, by necessity, operates at a distance from the
concrete problems and actions of the Union, such that credit for solving problems through European policy is often
taken by national governments, while the blame for all "European" problems is ascribed to the Commission
(Wallace 1996, 150). Likeyvise. the structure of the Council, centered upon national interest and consensus-based

decision making, does not facilitate the conception of "brilliant ideas", but rather encourages only the adoption of

ideas which are palatable to all members (Wallace 1996. 152). As a result, general principles and future visions
(contentious by nature) are sacrificed to squabbling over details, and action on tough issues (such as institutional
reform) is hard to come by, even with the allowance of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council.
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Most recently, a special report entitled TheInstitutional Implications ofEnlargement, was presented to the

European Commission on 18 October 1999. With an eye to recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the report
stresses the urgency of reform and the importance of binding the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the

EU in both a legal and a normative sense. While reaffirming the central objectives of both the Amsterdam Treaty'
and the Agenda 2000 report, the 18 October report stresses the fact that recent international developments have
forced the Union into an accelerated time frame in order to avoid further conflict in Europe's own back yard. "The

challenge for the present generation of European leaders is to attain the fundamental objective of enlargement

while also resolving, in the same time frame, one of its consequences, namely the need for such reform as will
enable an enlarged Union to perform effectively" (Wiezsacker, et. al. 1999, 3). It has been generally accepted that

the widening of the Union yvould require at least some institutional deepening; the current challenge is such that
these processes will need to be carried out simultaneously. The fact of the matter remains that an institutional
framework designed for six member states, and into which fifteen have been shoehorned. is in no way suited for an
expanded Union of over twenty members. With respect to the overall goals of both enlargement and institutional
reform, the report notes that "We must find ways of connecting or reconnecting to the people: why and hoyv the
institutions work and to whom they are accountable must be demystified" (Wiezsacker, et. al. 1999, 3). Once

again, the issue of the legitimacy, transparency and accountability of the Union to its citizens surfaces as a central
element to the viability of the Union in coming years. The strains on the institutional structure of an expanded
Union will likely be unbearable if the objectives outlined in the Amsterdam Treaty aimed at bringing the Union
closer to its citizens are not carried out as part of the enlargement process as well.
In addition to the issues of citizen participation and democratic legitimacy, both the Amsterdam Treaty

and the 18 October 1999 Report to the Commission identify three institutional changes of paramount importance to

the enlargement of the Union: the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council,
and the extension of qualified majority voting frame (Wiezsacker. et. al. 1999). Both documents emphasize the
need to maintain a Commission that is not an assembly of national delegates, but rather a true reflection of the

Community approach towards European policy.

Any reform should avoid tendencies toward national

representations, as the Commission needs to remain the institution which advocates, first and foremost, the
"European" (e.g. collective) aspects of the integration process. National interests will indeed remain important for
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the foreseeable future, but a Union governed by national interest will not beable to survive in the long term. With
the enlargement process proceeding at an ever faster clip, the Union must continually strive to reflect its collective

identity and shared norms, rather than exacerbate divisive national distinctions. In addition, the seemingly
inevitable extension of Union competencies into areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy - areas
currently governed by intergovernmental agreements - necessarily demand a gradual de-emphasizing of national
interests in favor of a collective approach to the wide range of issues which will face an expanded Union.
As the Union transforms itselffrom a system of economic integration to a more comprehensive system of
governance at the European level, it will undoubtedly be necessary to develop a structure which can deal with the

issues of"highpolitics" (e.g. the Common Foreign and Security Policy) as well as with the more traditional aspects
of economic integration. An institutional structure of this nature will certainly challenge the current balance of

European institutions and decision making processes. Reforms in this direction will likely include a greater power

of initiative for the European Parliament and increased application of QMV in the Council. Additionally, the
Union will have to examine a formula for keeping the number of Commissioners at a manageable number, most
likely by requiring that larger states surrender their second seat on the Commission. Such a step is much more
conceivable now, as compared with twenty years ago, as it is less likely to be perceived as a surrender of national

influence and sovereignty at the European level. The Commission will need to remain the policy engineer of the
Union, relatively free from national influence though linked to the citizenry through closer ties with the
Parliament.

Maintaining a workable balance of power among and within the Union institutions is one of the most

daunting challenges of the reform and enlargement process. If membership on the Commission and votes in the

Council continue to be allocated according to national population figures, the influx of many new votes from the
relatively populous yet economically underdeveloped CEECs will certainly disrupt the precarious balance of the
present system—defined mainly in terms of the net recipients and net donors to the Union. Those nations who

receive more than they pay into the Union budget will, with the accession of the CEECs, hold a clear majority in
each body. While this is not to say that European politics will necessarily become a battle between the "haves" and

the "have-nots", it is an important consideration, and one yvhich reinforces the importance of a instilling a
common normative framework oriented around cooperation. In order to be retain legitimacy and accountability,
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any new institutional structure of the Union must be reflective of the collective European identity and the
normative framework yvhich supports the Union in its entirety.

Compared with the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty did not bring about so much new

institutional change as it did consolidate the reforms of the Maastricht Treaty. In looking at the future challenges
of the Union, the Amsterdam Treaty recognized the importance of an shared normative basis for the Union and

incorporated this into the existing institutional structure. In doing so, the Amsterdam Treaty synchronized the
efforts of the Union on all fronts in preparation for the enlargement. The European Union is considerably better
prepared for the enlargement process because of the Amsterdam Treaty.

Enlargement

As the European Union grapples yvith the issue of enlarging its membership to accommodate the states of
Central and Eastern Europe, the essential nature of the European identity to the integration process is made clear.

As mentioned above, the pending expansion of the EU will not only strain the budget and institutional structure of
the Union, it will also challenge the philosophical underpinnings of the Union. Due to the recent events in the

Balkan region, the initial group of six accession states (Hungary, Poland. Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia
and Cyprus) could be folloyved by up to six more (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia) in
rapid succession: the membership of the EU could reach 25 by the middle of the next decade. One of the central

points stressed by the Commission's Agenda 2000 report and subsequent documents concerning the enlargement of
the EU has been the readiness of the accession candidates to accept the principles, norms and values which form

the essence of EU law and regulatory structures. An examination of Commission studies and progress reports for
each accession candidate reveals a considerable emphasis on the suitability of each candidate for membership in

more than just a set of political and economic agreements: a common normative framework is the foundation for a
true integration of the new states into the European Union.

While the Agenda 2000 and the principles of the Amsterdam Treaty remain the guiding policies for the

enlargement of the Union, recent events in Central and Eastern Europe have led to a redefinition of the priorities
and timetable for expansion. In a 4 November 1999 speech, Giinter Verheugen, Commissioner for Enlargement,

outlined an "offensive strategy" for the Commission andthe Union:6 "Peace and stability across Europe are not yet
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a matter of fact: they must be maintained in some areas and achieved in others. This is a situation where the

Commission has chosen to act as initiator and guardian.

It is a matter of using and enhancing political

momentum" (Verheugen 1999, 1). Noting that it is imperative to bring the candidates into the Union as quickly as
possible. Verheugen set, for the first time, a firm target date of 2002 for the decisions on the first group of

accession candidates. Verheugen also indicated that accession negotiations could begin immediately, on a countryby-country basis, with the remaining candidates - Latvia, Lithuania. Slovakia. Bulgaria. Romania and Malta
(Verheugen 1999, 4). Not only had the first group of accession candidates been repeatedly denied a firm date of

decision, the Commission did not foresee the opening of negotiations with the second group until after the first
round was completed. It is the aim of the Commission to establish a connection and link these nations to values

and institutions of the European Union in order to prevent future conflict in the region.
The Agenda 2000 report remains the guiding document in the overall enlargement process, even with

changes the outlined by Verheugen. The political agreement to the Commission's Agenda 2000 proposal was
reached on 26 March 1999 by the European Council in Berlin, at which time the three chief challenges facing the
Union were elucidated:

•

how to strengthen and reform the Union's policies (notably the Common Agricultural Policy
and the Social and Economic Cohesion) so that they can deal with enlargement and deliver
sustainable growth, higher employment and improved living conditions for Europe's
citizens;

•

how to negotiate the enlargement while at the same time vigorously preparing all applicant
countries

•

how to put in place a new financial framework for the period 2000-2006 (European
Commission, Agenda 2000. 1)

The Agenda 2000 also reiterated the central accession criteria for all applicant countries, as adopted at the 1993
European Council Meeting in Copenhagen. The Copenhagen Criteria require:

•

stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law. human rights and the protection
of minorities:

•

the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope yvith
competitive pressure and market forces yvithin the Union:

•

the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union (European Commission. Agenda 2000: For a
stronger and wider Union, 5)

These criteria still form the Union's central basis for accession negotiations, but are being vieyved as increasingly
flexible, as efforts concentrate on connecting with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The risk of
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isolating any particular state or group and inducing additional crises such as those in the former Yugoslavia is
simply too great. At the same time, the challenges are not to be overlooked. According to the Commission,
"...enlargement will bring considerable economic and political advantages. But the differences between Member

States will be more marked and adjustments in economic sectors and regions yvill need to be well prepared. The
candidate countries will need heavy investment in areas such as environmental protection, transport, energy,
industrial restructuring, agricultural infrastructure and rural society " (European Commission, Agenda 2000: For a
stronger and wider Union, 5). While the Agenda 2000 does not belittle the political, social and economic

challenges of integration, the message is also one of urgency, given the potential consequences of failing to
establish a meaningful relationship and instill democratic norms in the countries ofCentral and Eastern Europe.
One of the chief instruments for ensuring sufficient preparation for the candidate countries is the

Accession Partnership. Negotiated and tailored to each candidate's particular situation, the Accession Partnerships
have become the keystone of the Union's efforts to prepare the accession applicants for all aspects of the

Copenhagen Criteria, assessing progress and planning for eventual integration. The Accession Partnerships serve
as the instruments for all financial aid provided to the accession candidates by the EU, and are structured to

address the specific institutional and structural shortcomings in each of the accession candidates (European

Commission, Agenda 2000: For astronger and wider Union, 6). The Accession Partnerships do more than simply
provide economic aid and political advice to the accession candidates. By supporting in the establishment of

democratic institutions and the structures ofa civil society, the Accession Partnerships aid in linking the people of
the CEECs to the Union. In addressing this crucial connection between economic and social cohesion, the
Commission notes that "European-wide solidarity will be needed now more than ever if we are to achieve the

major objective of reducing disparities in development, as set out explicitly in Article 130a of the [Amsterdam]
Treaty" (European Commission, Commission Publishes its Communication, 2). In particular, the institutional

framework which is established through the Accession Partnerships is conducive to nurturing a common normative
structure and conveying the values and principles ofthe EU to the countries ofCentral and Eastern Europe.

Amajor concern ofthe assemblage ofdocuments and treaties on enlargement can be expressed through
the notion of European solidarity. Such an overriding concern for social and economic cohesion indicates the

significant role which acommon normative structure and compatible model ofgovernance and participation would
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play in bringing all countries ofthe European Union into alignment—not only in terms of laws and regulations,
but also in their goals and processes. In a Commission press release which accompanied the publication of the
Agenda 2000. it is noted that beyond economic goals, "Europeans also want a cohesive and inclusive society based
on solidarity, as well as a high quality of life, sound environment, freedom, security and justice. The internal

policies ofthe Union should be more resolutely oriented towards meeting these objectives" (European Commission.
Agenda 2000 Press Release, 2). The Commission also notes that along with considerable political and economic
advantages, the increased heterogeneity of an expanded Union will require increased efforts to reduce sectoral and

regional disparities (European Commission, Agenda 2000 Press Release, 9). Similarly, Gunter Verheugen
emphasized in a speech on the enlargement of the Union, that "Enlargement is the most effective means we have of

upholding our shared values across Europe" (Verheugen 1999. 2). The central point is the connection ofEuropean
normsand values with processes of economic and political integration.

The EUROSTAT office has also conducted Eurobarometer surveys of public opinion in Central and

Eastern Europe (CEEB), with the latest poll having been conducted during November of 1997. Support for the
accession process and public opinion concerning European Union are both positive, especially among the first
wave ofaccession candidates. Significant for the pre-accession strategy- of the Union, the correlation present in the

EU 15 between education and support for the integration process is also replicated in the CEECs (European
Commission, CEEB No 8). Such a predominant correlation between education and information about the Union

underscore the importance ofefforts to establish a normative framework and civil society tradition along with the
institutional structures being built upin the accession candidates. An informed public will be much more likely to
support the integration process. Additionally, the citizens of the CEECs hold the principles upon which the Union

is built, namely democracy and respect for fundamental rights, in high esteem. These findings are all the more

significant when compared yvith the fact that an overwhelming majority (95%) of EU citizens view respect for
human rights and the principles of democracy as the most important criteria for enlargement: only 75% viewed a
comparable level of economic development as an important criteria for enlargement (Eurobarometer No. 51. 74).

Furthermore, enlargement is one ofthe first instances where public opinion played a large part in determining the
course of integration. With respect to the decision to open the Union to the CEECs. "Voters were not involved: but

editorialists and column-writers across the political spectrum, before the consequences were given much
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consideration, with rare unanimity pronounced any other course unthinkable" (Anderson 1997. 137). The people
ofthe European Union clearly recognized the necessity ofconnections with their neighbors to the east, and also the

importance ofcommon norms and values inthe creation ofa legitimate union and common identity.
In conjunction with the institutional reforms necessitated by enlargement, the Amsterdam Treaty
introduces the concept ofcloser cooperation as a means by which the Union can effectively cope with the dramatic
increase in membership (European Commission. The Amsterdam Treaty). More commonly referred to as variable-

speed integration, the unprecedented formalization of this institutional arrangement would essentially allow
accession candidates to proceed atdifferent rates in their integration into the EU. While adamantly disavowing the
possibility that member states should be allowed to opt in orout ofany obligations to membership, the 18 October

report to the Commission did indicate that increased institutional flexibility could well facilitate the enlargement,

especially in light ofthe accelerated time frame (Wiezsacker. et. al. 1999). In like fashion Gunter Verheugen
indicated that it would be necessary to grant transitional arrangements with most accession candidates in order to

meet the ambitious schedule set out by the Commission, thereby necessitating a "differentiated approach" which

would permit only limited transition periods with respect to the internal market, but yvould grant greater leeway to
accession candidates in conforming to Union regulations inother areas (Verheugen 1999, 4). The prospect is thus
not ofa Union where member states proceed at their own pace, but rather a Union which recognizes the difficulties

in accommodating six new, underdeveloped members while at the same time reforming its own institutional
structure. In this way, the principle ofcloser cooperation avoids a situation of selective integration, where states

would pick and choose the aspects ofthe Union to which they would subscribe. Instead, closer cooperation builds

on the increased diversity ofan expanded Union to ensure that every new member state is eventually integrated
into the full institutional and normative structure of the Union.
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Conclusions

Institutional changes in the European Union, especially those consolidated in the Treaties from

Amsterdam and Maastricht, have moved the Union from a complex arrangement ofintergovernmental agreements
built around a free trade zone to an increasingly integrated federal structure with groyving political and social
dimensions. These changes have drawn the Union closer together in an institutional sense. At the same time, a

European identity- has developed to the point where it is a significant factor - at times alongside institutional
integration, at times pushed by institutional integration, and at times directing the course of institutional
integration. The interaction between identity and institutions is the chief issue facing the EU, both in its inner
development andits outward expansion. The Amsterdam Treaty is the first explicit declaration ofthe fact that the

interaction ofidentity and institutions over time has brought about a convergence ofnorms and values on top ofthe

institutional structure ofthe Union. Conceptions of identity at all levels have been changed throughout Europe,
along with ideas of political participation and the role of Europe in general: new expressions of identity are
surfacing throughout Europe at local, regional and supranational levels. The Treaty of Amsterdam, perhaps
unintentionally, has ended up being a large step in institutionalizing norms - social and identity factors - which

should contribute significantly to the formation and solidification ofa collective identity in Europe. Codification
and internalization of these norms is also an indispensable preparation for the expansion of the Union.

The fact that the institutions established by sovereign states have developed to the point where they now
impact on the interest calculations, attitudes, perceptions, and identities of member states and individuals within

the EU isan unprecedented development on this scale. The overall process ofpooling sovereignty which grew out

of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties has taken many forms - federalism, regionalism, subsidiarity.
Community decision making - blurring the distinction between international and domestic politics and radically
altering the political spectrum throughout Europe. The concurrent processes of institutional change and identityformation make up the biggest impetus for successful integration in the European Union.

If nurtured and

cultivated, these mutually reinforcing processes have the potential to create an authentic European civil society and
foster a sense of belonging together amongthe citizensof Europe.

As the integration process continues, it will have to be matched by a gradual expansion of Union

competencies as well. The deepening of the Union is necessary to ensure that educational and social policies work
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towards social cohesion. The EU has already advanced past the point yvhere intergovernmental agreements can be

efficient policy solutions to Union-wide issues, and this is all the more true with the imminent expansion of the
Union membership. Though flexibility is of the utmost importance, policies should be devised yvithin a cohesive

Union frameyvork which incorporates the normative foundation of the European Union. The flexible federalist
structure which has evolved out of the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent accommodations for the accession

candidates seems to be a practicable solution to the multitude ofissues confronting the Union. While maintaining
a strong Union structure and prohibiting "opt-outs" by Union members, the flexible approach allows accession

candidates the ability to proceed at a pace suited to their level of development once the basic Copenhagen Criteria
are fulfilled. In this way, the Union avoids a situation of perpetual discouragement in the accession candidates

who, admittedly, have many reforms to tackle before they arebrought up to speed with the existing member states.
To be certain, the future of European integration is not a foregone conclusion. The Union faces many

challenges, and itsrelative success in the half-century since the end of WWII are but a mere bump in the long road
of European history. For that matter, the historical record itselfis ambiguous at best - cases of multinational states

and previous attempts at integration do not present a clear picture of success. Most notably, the disintegration of
Yugoslavia from a once stable multi-national state into the most conflict-ridden region of modern Europe calls into
question the assumed success of European integration. Similarly, the USSR united the peoples of vastly different

cultures and traditions for nearly all of the 20th century under a common identity based on certain norms of
political and economic behavior found in the Marxist-Leninist Communist ideology. What is most revealing,
though, about these two cases of (failed) integration is the extent to which identity and unity itself was imposed
through a top-down, state-dominated ideology often backed with military or police power, even if only in the form
ofan implicit fear ofdissension. Admittedly, the values and ideals ofthe Soviet Union or Yugoslavia were in fact

internalized and shared among the people, but this constructed common identity proved untenable in the long run
simply because it did not reflect a common yvill to be together or a sense ofbelonging together: it yvas not wholly
reflective ofthe values, ideals and will ofthe people inquestion. Both ofthese attempts at integration were toppled
from beloyv by disillusioned, discontented populations.

In contrast, both Switzerland and Canada offer positive examples of multi-national states which have

successfully maintained social cohesion and in fact recognized a common identity yvhich transcends (yvithout
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replacing) the other local, national and ethnic identities. While Canadian unity has been strained by French

Canadian secessionist tendencies, current efforts seem to be directed more toyvards recognizing and celebrating
diversity in the Canadian population rather than continued attempts to divide the state. More instructive for the
case of European integration, however, is Switzerland, an example to yvhich the Union could yvell take heed.

Democratic political processes which bring nearly- all issues to the citizen, combined yyith a respect for strong local
and regional differences (i.e. identities), has produced a remarkably stable multi-national system.

The

distinguishing factor between the cases of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and those of Canada and Switzerland
center on democratic political processes and civil society development. In the latter (successful) cases of multi

national integration, meaningful avenues for input into political processes and for association between citizens and

actors in society allow for the creation and expression of values, norms and ideals from the bottom up, rather than
being imposed from the top down. In addition to democratic political systems, both Switzerland and Canada

embody norms of free speech and association which allow society to define itself in large part, and express its oyvn
identity rather than the constructed identity of an ideological system. Democratic processes allow individuals to

help define the collective identity, thus promoting an identification with the collective as a part of the self. The

crucial link between politics and culture is present, and the actions of the state or larger identity are legitimized
through the input of the people.

The experiences of multi-national integration thus far highlight the importance of the developing
normative framework in the European Union, and also emphasizes the central role of the Amsterdam Treaty as

consolidator of these norms and values. Fifty years is not much on the scale of history, and the Union's future is

far from certain.

However, simple cultural commonalties are no more adequate than engineered political

institutions in developing a true system of governance at the European level. The direction of the Union toyvards

more democratic processes and greater citizen involvement are positive indicators - without progress in this
direction, the Union would face certain failure.

The development of a European civil society and norms of

cooperation throughout Europe bode yvell for the future of integration.

At the same time, it is of paramount importance to ensure that the states in the European Union's own

backyard do not fall victim to the ethnic and nationalist conflicts yvhich have already torn apart the former

Yugoslavia. The surest way to ensure that these newly independent statesdo not become tomorrow's battleground
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is by firmly attaching them to the norms and values of the European Union yvhich are at the base of economic and

political integration. In this respect, institutional reform has become an urgent necessity for the European Union,

in order to ensure that the Union is capable of accepting the neyy members states as soon as is practically possible.
Enlargement and institutional change are not separate or distinct processes. They are tied to one another by the
developing normative framework and identity in Europe - an ethos of shared norms and values which serve to

unite the people beyond artificial economic structures and trade agreements. The EU must also step down to the
level of the citizen and incorporate a social and cultural policy yvhich is both sensitive to the diversity across
Europe, yet recognizes the power and importance of a common normative foundation. The significance of
education and access to information about the Union as a method to enhance the legitimacy and democratic
accountability of the Union in the eyes of its citizens cannot be underestimated. The EU will have to work out

these issues alongside any institutional reforms if it hopes to make the transition from a well-developed trade zone
to a true political and economic union in accordance with the principles stated in the Amsterdam Treaty.
All in all. the Union is facing a crisis of legitimization in this period of transition, indicative of the areas

of ambiguity that exist between the national and Union levels of governance. As a result, new forms of European
identity such as regional and transnational associations surface as expressions of the multiple identities yvhich exist

in European society. As the preceding pages have established, the elements of a European collective identity—a
common past, shared experiences and a common normative framework—do in fact exist. Moreover, the citizens of

Europe are becoming increasingly awareof this shared identity which unitesthem, and are beginning to give assert
to this element of their identity in politics. The power and necessity of recognizing the common European identityis vital to the integration process: it is the crucial, legitimizing link between culture and politics, such that the
values of European citizens find expression in the politics of Europe and the integration process. To this end. an
atmosphere of transparency based on shared norms and values will foster the connections and associations of a

European civil society, and thus yvork to ensure social cohesion and develop a true sense of belonging and identity
at the European level. As the Union expands its borders and its competencies - widening and deepening to meet
the challenges of the future - it yvill be necessary to continue to form connections between the institutions of Union

and the values of European societies. The key to an authenticity and legitimacy in the integration process is the
link betyveen culture and politics found in the European identity.
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Notes

1Kaelble uses the term "das gelebte Europa" yvhich I have translated as "the European experience"
2The conference took place 30 September - 1October. 1999. in Bruges.

3See Weigle and Butterfield (1992) for an examination of the role of civil society in the social transformation of
the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

4See Hasenclever, et. al. (1997) for a thorough analysis ofinterdependence theory and theories ofinternational
cooperation.

5The subsidiarity principle states that decisions should be taken asclosely aspossible to the citizens ofthe Union
"in accordance with Article 5 (ex Article 3b) ofthe EC Treaty [...] the Community shall take action 'only if and
in sofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of scale or effects ofthe proposed action, bebetter achieved by the Community'" (European
Commission, The Amsterdam Treaty).

"Enlargement: Speed andQuality" at the conference "The Second Decade towards a New andIntegrated Europe'
Den Haag, 4 November 1999.
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